Fall of Empires: Reexamining Roman and Tang Reliance on Foreign Mercenaries
The Roman Empire was the largest state Europe has ever seen, with lasting legacies on its successors and the modern world. The Tang Dynasty was a golden-era of Chinese history with unique cultural and military preeminence. What do two of the most powerful empires of their times have in common? A number of historians attribute the overreliance on foreign soldiers and mercenaries as a strong cause to the decline of both the Roman Empire and Tang Dynasty. The later Roman Empire increasingly depended on foederati, or treaty-bound “barbarian” communities, as frontier soldiers and commanders. Likewise, a turning point in Tang history was the An Lushan Rebellion led by a non-Han Tang general, which was a shock the Tang never recovered from. This article will argue that state decline cannot be fully attributed to reliance on foreign service, and that the very term “foreign” should be closely examined and taken with a grain of salt.
Brief History of the Roman Army
Rome’s early army was centered around a core of professional citizen-soldiers (your classic legionnaires) supported by local auxiliary units that commonly came from non-Roman origins. Early empire logistics were able to support this system that expanded the Roman Empire to the height of its might. However, as civil wars mounted and border incursions intensified, the military system needed to evolve to meet new threats. Organization became increasingly regional and focused on the frontiers, which meant a greater reliance on the local populace for defense. Roman military composition also changed over time, as their traditionally heavy infantry was gradually supplemented by more and more light skirmishers and cavalry, which have always predominantly come from non-Roman populaces. The defense of Late Rome’s borders relied much on foederati, barbarian tribes which fought for Rome in exchange for settled lands. A common hypothesis is that reliance on foederati decreased Roman combat effectiveness, quality, and loyalty, ultimately becoming a leading cause of the downfall of the Empire (or at least the Western half of it).
However, recent literature has challenged the extent of this view. While there were certainly foederati relations that ended badly for Rome (i.e. Vandals), there were also groups that were loyal until the end, like the Franks and Burgundians. Magister Militum titles (military general) were definitely not conferred upon non-Romans in the early Empire as much as the late one, but there is scant evidence to suggest that Roman generals of foreign origin had the interests of Rome any less in their hearts as Roman ones. Ricimer, a Roman general of Sueve-Visigothic origins, fought hard to preserve the wavering integrity of the Western Roman Empire from 461 to his time of death in 472. It can be said that increasing reliance on foreign mercenaries was not the root of the declining fighting capability of the empire, but rather a reflection of it. It is not conclusive to say that foreign recruits were any less loyal, capable, or disciplined just due to their foreignness.
Tang’s Dynamic Army Structure
The Tang Dynasty’s early army centered around the fu bing (regimental army), a central army, and foreign mercenaries. The fu bing was a system where prestigious military families provided a male member to fight and train in return for land and tax exemptions. Fu bing members would farm off-duty, but take up arms when called for an expedition. The central army also consisted of professional and hereditary military families that guarded the capital. Foreign mercenaries served as the majority of the Tang cavalry, which was integral to their military successes. However, during the reign of Empress Wu (690–705 CE), increasing frontier pressures led to an overhaul of the military system and abandonment of the fu bing structure. Surrounded by enemies on all sides, from Nanzhao to the south, Tibet to the West, and nomadic empires to the North, the Tang was forced to station permanent armies at its frontiers, something fu bing could not sustain. This development led to the creation of regional military commands led by military governors called jiedushi. The composition of the frontier officer corps was increasingly made up of individuals from poor Han families and foreign backgrounds. By the reign of Emperor Xuanzong (713–756 CE), jiedushi not only had military privileges of recruiting and leading regional armies, but also civil privileges such as collecting taxes and enacting laws.
The traditional blame for the An Lushan rebellion falls on chancellor Li Linfu, who in order to decrease political rivals at court, decreed that all the military governorships should be given to non-Han commanders. This led to the titular general An Lushan, who was of Sogdian and Gokturk origins, to have command over three commanderies, which was an inordinate amount of military control. A number of political events eventually culminated in his rebellion, which cost the empire anywhere from 13–36 million deaths (civilian and military). It is easy to shift the focus of the rebellion on An Lushan’s foreignness, but the nature of the revolt was not one of foreign vs Han, as An Lushan was very much “sinicized” and sought to establish a proper “Chinese” dynasty with the requisite rituals and such. Additionally, it is not hard to imagine that a rebellion would have been likely regardless of An Lushan’s ethnic origins. Similar to the Roman Empire, to say that foreign soldiers were any less capable, disciplined, or loyal only on account of their foreignness would be a massive disservice to their important contributions to the defense of the Tang border.
Similarities and Differences
There are important differences to note between the happenings of the two empires. For one, the Tang Dynasty still survived around another 140 years after the An Lushan rebellion, and its downfall was brought about by ethnic Han commanders, not foreign ones (although foreign mercenaries no doubt complimented armies of all sides). The Western Roman Empire at least fell to “barbarian” incursion, but it can be argued that the Eastern Roman Empire (aka Byzantine Empire) is a true continuation of the Roman empire, so did Rome really fall? Roman foederati tribes also seem to have stronger senses of communal unity than Tang Dynasty foreign mercenaries did. Roman foederati had kings, for example Alaric of the Visigoths, which at least in current historiography has helped distinguish distinct tribes from one another. While the Tang had treaties with other states that might have compelled military aid in times of need, the more permanent mercenaries at the border do not seem to have the organizational level of the foederati.
The similarities between the two empires are striking as well. Both increased their reliance on foreign mercenaries due to their long, dangerous borders, and the inability of a central logistical military system to sustain border defense. Foreign troops also accounted for unit types that empires lacked in native numbers, mainly cavalry, which were critical to military success in certain parts of the two empires. High military commands were also gradually conferred in increasing numbers to officers of foreign origin, which led to their growing prominence in political affairs. It is also not fair to say, in both instances, that commanders of foreign origin were any less effective or loyal than “native” ones. Stilicho (half-Vandal) scored a number of victories for the Western Roman Empire from 382–408 CE, prolonging its existence. Gao Xianzhi (Korean) bravely fought against both the Abbasid Caliphate and An Lushan as a general of the Tang army.
An Important Caveat
One aspect to note is the cosmopolitan nature of both empires by its heights. The definition of what constitutes Roman, Chinese, and barbarian is precisely why I like to use quotations around these terms. In many instances, Roman auxiliaries of foreign origin served in the military as a path to citizenship. If a Gaulish tribesmen properly achieved citizenship, would he not be Roman as well? For the Tang Dynasty, “foreign” elements extended all the way into the royal family. The Li family that founded the Tang Dynasty had maternal ancestry from the Xianbei, a northern nomadic tribe. This familial connection is part of the reason why Emperor Taizong was able to simultaneously hold the title of Chinese Emperor and Heavenly Qhaghan of the Turkic Khaganate at one point. It might also partially explain the Tang Dynasty’s particular comfort with using foreign mercenary cavalry. For both empires, there is no clear definition of what is foreign and what is native, as they both encompassed expansive territories with large, diverse populations. As the cultural centers of their respective worlds, surrounding tribes and nations more often than not respected the cultural authority of these great empires, even after their downfalls. The “barbarian” tribes that overran the Roman empire in many instances preserved the civil and military institutions the Romans created, as they were crucial to governing the new states that were formed in the aftermath of the empire’s collapse. Similarly, cultural influences that the Tang had on surrounding states, including the Korean kingdoms, Japan, and Vietnam, can be found even today.
Evidently, recent literature suggests that past consensus on subjects of imperial decline is not as simple as it seems. As much as Rome was ravaged by its so-called barbarian neighbors, its very existence was also extended due to the unwavering loyalty of some critical non-Roman characters. Similarly, the Tang Dynasty’s border security was ensured in great part due to non-Han recruits, and its downfall can be attributed more to policy blunders. Traditional accounts of history should continuously be scrutinized and re-examined. The more contrarian lenses we apply to accounts of history, the closer we will get to the elusive “truth.”
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